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p.3 notes SEA ignored by most political anthropologists, recent work showing early his. SEA less centralized and stable than formerly assumed. Notes break in disciplinary approach and interpretation from prehistoric to protohistoric periods. p.3-4:"In the case of the former, almost everyone is convenced that hardly any political centralization can be found... But in the historical period the image of the polities is suddenly reversed: we now find hierarchical systems led by strong autocratic kings, without any reference to strong organizationcal changes that might have occurred in the meantime". p.4 argues that early SEA pol. struct. went through alternating centralization, decentralization and recentralization. - p.5 but on a longer cycle than the Kachin. Insufficient agricultural production and innovation could not support the demands for feasts and brideprices, which lead to decntraliztion in Kachin sys. based on ladang. Exhaustion of material means also lead to undermining the state sys., but decline was more related to "erosion of political networks and the inflation of legitimation" p.7 also chooses to focus on the Indianzed part of SEA and exclude the sinicized. p.19 "Smith (1979:445) notices for the Mekong area (Map 1) in the eighth century a decrease in the number of supraregional centres, as a srcult of their ongoing clustering under supervision of yet largers ones" p.21 sedov describes post Funan Chenla polities of equal strength "passing through an identical process of early state formation" - but never unified. State formation more successful in the 9th century when Jayavarman II united several regional centres, lasted until the 15th c. p.29 Sanscrit inscriptions 1st appeared in 3rd c. AD, inscriptions in SEA languages 1st appeared in 7th c. p.36 notes later dynastic annals manipulated chronology such that separated events are treated as though contemporary. p.38 several myths on Uthong, founder of Ayudhyan dynasty: one Uthong was son of a beggar who married the daughter of a king, another a Chinese immigrant who married the daughters of several Thai kings and thus united the territory. p.41. K.Hall said "Cambodian `state' elites 1shared control of land and authority with a number of other regional elites and institutions and developed a style of statecraft based on the interdependence of political, economic and relaitions institutions". Thwin on Pagan says that "religious endowments and the grant of fiefs tended to diffuse land and lavour. Inevitably, this pattern created numerous centres of economic and political power and patronage instead of just one." p.43 "I argue that we are not dealing with a single position at the top of a political hierarchy ( as is suggested in the sources) but with a number of competing political leaders all striving of overlordship. ... It is not a case of one hereditary position from which others can automatically be domenated, but rather a case of achieved positions, susually won after severe competition." p.49 notes rice agri and water control not tied into to state formation. says Krisch (1984:258) says that Law of King Mangrai (AD 1259-1317) of Lanna indicates that irrigation is a private not a public activity. Also that Tanabe (1977:30) says that Chao Phraya irrigation projects during the Ayudhya were community or individual works, not government projects. p.50. Ankhor waterworks may not have been connected to commercial village level waterways - and may have served only for ideological, legitimising purposes. If water did not serve to tie elites and subordinates together, what was it? draws on population growth, caused by internal growth and inmigration. p.51 but labor shortage for armies may have stimulated centralization. p.77 cognatic descent used for legitimation. Males and females were equally important and had equal rights to an inheritance. "...descent and alliance were used and manilpulated to acquire territorial relationships... cognatic descent groups were unlikely to generate strong unilineal political leadership, and other features such as personal skills. achievements, charisma, and material wealth should be taken into consideration." p.78. A leader's success in warfare was important in legitimation. p.88 traders existed in early centralized societies but not as part of the official supra-regional political system. Sukhotai inscriptions refer to trade not monopolized by Political leaders unlike Prome, Pegu or Ayudhya. Law stated that people were more valuable than soil Because territorial relations were based on patron-client relations, kinship and marriage alliances, boundaries and alliegences could vary from generation to generation. p.89 Early centers built few roads - Sukhotai had one to PanPan. Angkor's roads dated from only 1180. Therefore transporation relied on water which varied seasonally. Made administration difficult across river systems. p.91 ..."the position of supraregional and regional centres over time were mutually interchangeable. p.93 notes difficulty in the vocabulary for polities in the various SEA languages where a term can be used for polities of various sizes and importance. e.g. rwa can mean village or world. "It seems that every regional centre had - and, more importantly, kept - the potential to become the core of a supraregional political system" p.94 regional polities were replicas of supraregional polities which allowed for their interchangeability when a leader weakened. p.95-6 comments on difficulty of understanding logic of orgnaization of officials and adminstrative structures. Notes that political titles may have been structure vertically and less horizontally meaning that hierarchical structure may have been much less strict than sometimes assumed. There was an "abundance of ranks in which it is difficult to find any order. p.96 regional leaders received titles of ceremonial function to the supraregional center but not clearly ot political function. only 18th c. Ayudhaya had political functionaries who were sent to the regional centers to over see the regional rulers. "Although there was diversification of roles, the content of those roles was often rather vague, multi-interpretable, and apparently mutually interchangeable." p.98 taxation more like tribute - depended on goodwill, kinship, and filial ties, not soe much on judicial and fiscal control. [reread 97-98] p.99 political functionaries got some gifts from the supraregional leaders, but got most of their income from "clan lands". Clan temples consumed most of their produce, giving a symbolic contribution to the supraregional center. Supraregional centers were more concerned with ritual harmony of the local temples than economic dominance. p.100 purchase of office by political functionaries and sale of monopolies common. Functional titles may have been more honorific, may have had little administrative implications. "Surplus was not collected in the capital and reallocated by the ruler, but for the most part remained in the periphery and was therefore beyond his control." "...the scarcity of population in Southeast Asia on the one hand and the relative ease with which one could live 'in the jungle' without large-scale organization on the other hand, made people valuable objects for the larger political system. All kinds of measures were taken to get or to keep commoners attached to nobles and supraregional rulers (Akin... Tambiah... p.102 early SEA political systems relied on networks of patronage. Sincet these were based on contract, they could be ended by either party. Patrons gave protection, honour and gifts, clients supported the patron with manpower. Networks fluctuated and were vulnerable during succession, because the new king might be the political opponent of one's patron. Redistribution only function in the immediate vicinity of the capital. in land grants, the land granted may already be controlled by the grantee. p.103 In addition to royal grants, land was bought and sold independent of the leader, and lordship did not imply ownership in the modern sense. Simultaneous rights may exist. p.104 local indigenous law outweighed Indian law in effect. Laws were not codified but were adhoc decisions by the ruler which established no precedent. 14th c. laws were codified. p.106 in "early SEA, it seems that force could be used onlyu to a limited extent. Power had to be negotiated. Subjects had to be kept content with their situation
otherwise they would flee to another lord" A person who moblized sufficient man power was allowed to found a new krom in Ayudhya. p. Bargatzky on maladaptation of subsystems in suprasystemic dominence: "political integration is characterized by dependence of the subsystems on the suprasystem, by disintegration of the internal coherence of the subsystem in favor of the growth of the suprasystem. The dependence of the subsystems on the suprasystem is related to theri economic specialization, which prevents possible self-suffiency (`the greater the specialization, the greater the dependence upon the total system'). If this dependence does not exist, the supra-system cannot gain sufficnet control over the subsystems and the overall organization wil remain fragile and possibly collapse. Taking this as our point of departure, it seems that the curcial issue in early Southeast Asian politics was that the subsystems (the regional centres) mostly remained indepenedent of the suprasystems... The suprasystems, could not, or did not try to, achieve a substantial and effective hold over the sytsystems. The subsystems remained in some sense comptetitors of the suprasystem because essentially they ahd access to the same reousrces. This equity caused problems of legitimation and therefore problems of dmoinence." p. 111 both regional and supraregional leaders had access to the same legitimizing vocabulary. e.g. the regional leader of Thaton (theoretically under Pagan) Makuta included king of kings, highest lord... armor of the three worlds (of men, devas, and brahmas) and of all the regions of copper". p.112 succession lacked strict rules. "Legitimacy depended to a considerable extent on the person of the political leader rather than on insitutions or territorial claims... Not only sons, but but also brothers, uncles, cousins and nephews of a supraregional leader could claim succession to a throne." Buddhist-Hindu concepts in general did not stabilizing effects. Concept of the kammaraja allowed for successful actions in the present life to be the basis for attaining leadership. Someone with strong karma could depose a weak ruler with weaker karma. Aung Thwin notes that 8 of the 9 kings of Pagan during the 11th-13th centuries were not in immediate line to the throne. Sedov note in Ankhor only nine out of 32 father to son power transfers occured. p.113..."a number of rivals strove for overlordship, in a simultaneous and constant competition in which the shrewdest would win." immense personal charisma or great economic resources were nec. to win the competition to be ruler. The death of such big men would precipitate a major political crisis, warfare, intrigue, and manipulation p.114 inscriptions and annals refering to preceding relatives were not in fact related. "... emphasis on descent was intended to bring ideological order into everyday chaos, rahter than to indicate the real line of succession."... "There were in fact three ways by which early SEA rulers could claim rights to succession: a patrilineal relationship with a previous ruler
a matrilineal relationship with more distant famous historical personages
and bilineal relations with mythical figures, such as the Naga princess and the Sun prince. Whether emphasis was given to one of another of these possibilities depended on pragmatic factors. As all three ways of tracing descent had legtiimizing value, there is clear scope for manipulation by individuals who had not direct relations with a reigning ruler, but had sufficient power to overthrow other contenders for the throne." p.115 Thwin 1976a:288:"personalities prevailed over institutions" p.115 long distance trade had a big impact: "Supraregional leaders tried to monopolize long-distance trade but communication difficulties made these endeavours extremely difficult" p.116 regional centers often derived income from trade which assisted in keeping them independent of the supraregional center. Thus supraregional center was not able to dominate subsystems because they had their own resources. Also because supraregional centers alos traded, they were less dependent on taxing regional units. Pagan and Ayuthya were not interested in agriculture and irrigation because trade was considered more lucrative. Same applied to Angkhor only after the 9th c. becuase trade developed in the 10th and 11th c. Angkhor earlier were most concerned with the state temple system. When supraregional power cannot dominate the long-distance trade, trade can have a decentralizing effect - the reverse from when the center can dominate trade and trade cn lead to increased bureaucrasy. p. 117"According to Wolters ... even in pre-Angkor days gift-giving clarified or illuminated the inequality of souls" in a chiefdom "... the chief is obliged to distribute ... while the subjects cannot be forced to had over their surplus because their relationship to the chief is on a voluntary basis. In more mature state sustems the situation is reversed... Southeast Asian data seem to present a picture of an intermediate situation. It appears that in the inchoate early states - as the supraregional political formations of early SEA may be labled - the `giving' of the rulers was not symbolic at all. Most of the early SEA inscriptions concern the (careful) recording of land grants, the donation of slaves and valuablers, or order to gain merit (karma)." article by Aung Thwin (1979 and 1976b) points out that merit making gifts were not only religious, but displayed wealth in the present life. [demonstrates the haves and the have-nots] p.118 Brand notes that donations of rulers to monasteries were large and often excessive which he explains via Mauss's theory that giving shows that one is more than the receiver ( see Parry 1986 for new interpretation of Mauss) This aspect of Buddhism and of Hindu Siva cults is related to local "Little Tradition" "in which the role of the politifcal leader in feasting and gift-giving in honour of local ancestors... the power of local political leaders was focused on communication with these ancestors, the success of which depended on the quantity of the donations during the ceremonies". p.119 leaders were supposed to give more than they received p.120 "In Pagan society, social status was measured by how much one donated to religion, rather than by how much one accumulated. A man's social and spiritual rank was equivilent to the size of his donations" "To maintain his position, a reigning ruler had to ensure that he remained ahead of others in religious donations and had to prevent the accululation of excessive riches by his political functionaries and competitors" In Angkor this was done by forbidding teh institution of misrabhoga, the joining of rights to land of more than one lcoal estate temple without the approval of the king and by persuading political functionaries to make religious donations in the name of the ruler. Politcal functionaries paid their taxes in the form of donations to the state temples. p.121 "Only when the political organization in which they functioned attained a more developed form and their power increased, did their presetns become more symbolic and economically less valuable. "A strong ruler could force his subordinates to make religious domations in his name, thus making it impossible for them to sue the legitimating aspects of the donations for thier own benefit. p.122 "After a donation, local and regional elites retained actual ownership of a plot of land, the temple onlu receiving a share of the income... the advantages for other (minor) political leaders to donate land and goods to temples were to acquire religious merit
to allow for more efficient management of thier plotsd of land, and to avoid revenue demands of politicla elites claiming rights to share the local landed elite's possessions." p.123 "But after subsequent reigns of several political leaders at one partucular supraregional centre, the economic and political possibilities of this centre would be exhausted, irredspective of the background, intentions, and abilities of these leaders
an increasing part of the property of the supraregional rulers would be spent on public (relgious) investments and an increasing part would go into the hands of families of political functionaries or of religious institutions... These families were already in a faourable position , as their own donations to religious institutions remained de facto their property... In the course of time, `non-royals' could accumulate considerable material wealth by serving several rulers". In Angkhor, until the 11th c. lots of donations by subordinates in name of ruler to temple. The donation would be exempt from taxes. Worked while legitamacy of overlord was high. In 12th c. donations by subordinates in name of overlord declined and overlord had to invest in his own wealth ot shore up legitamacy. p.127 Supraregional leader could control donations to temple only in his capital area, again could not dominate regional subsystems. "For his share in the riches of the religious institutions, the supra regional political leader was dependent on the good will and loyalty of the regional lords. But in order to ensure himself of this loyalty, the supraregional leader either had to be incredibly successful in warfare so that others could share in the booty, or he had to reword and donate from his won resources. "To maintain his corps of political functionaries and to survive plitically the ruler had to hand out land, people, and other valuables. This obligation is a structural weakness of the system, whether or not it is called feudalism... It appears that if, after a few generations, no solution to this development is found - in the form of a well-developed taxation system based on a monetary economy - an early state is dooned to collapse sooner or later because of too many centrifugal flows of public property..." Chronic manpower and population shortages lead to encouragement even institutionalization of ties of patronage between functionaries and commoners. Lead to ability develop an effective and mobile army. but the patronage ties could also be turned against the supra regional leader. Rulers had to give lavishly materially to maintain commoner loyalty. e.g. Lanna law of King Mangrai - people who clear new land get 3 years tax break. Acts of bravery in battle should be rewarded with money, land, wife, titles, etc. p.128 two levels of cyclical developments. short term succession disputes. longer term supraregional formation. Overlord successors inherited the situation from a previous ruler and was expected to take up public religious donations and competition with regional leaders where the predecssor left off. After several reigns of centrifugal flow of goods, means became exhausted, and regional leaders lost interest in becoming the leader of that particular supraregional center. Internal cohesion diminished making the system vulnerable to external attack. Whole thing would start over with a new center. [Continued on record 1113]
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